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MARK E. CHOPKO *
Abstract: Although the U.S. Constitution protects the rights of religious
institutions, it confers no general immunity from liability for their
contracts and torts. This Article's study of the case law indicates that
claims may be stated against religious institutions if those institutions
had the corporate power or ecclesiastical responsibility for the specific
matter in dispute, or had themselves taken action in the matter. A
general assertion of the potential to take action or potential to control
is insufficient to result in a claim against the institution. Liability would
reside, if at all, in the entity that has both the juridic power (under the
religious polity) and the civil duty to answer for the actions of persons
or other entities in the religious structure. Departure from these
principles could result in an 'unconstitutional exercise by a court. This
Article then applies these principles in a critique of tort liability asserted
against religious institutions.
INTRODUCTION
In other eras, it would have been unimaginable for churches and
other religious institutions to be sued. Like other charitable institu-
tions in American society, religious institutions enjoyed a privileged
status, protected not only by legal immunity for their benefits to the
greater society but also held in a place of honor and respect by ordi-
nary citizens. We still admire charities and still hold religion in a place
of honor, but we expect religious institutions to be accountable when
they make mistakes. It was the reality, and remains so today, that relig-
ious institutions make contracts that they break, create risks for which
they must be responsible, and conduct many activities in the larger
.society that impact the general public, beyond their members. There
is no longer any serious debate that religious organizations are held
responsible for the consequences of their actions. The demise of
* Mr. Chopko is the General Counsel of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops in
Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of the University of Scranton and the Cornell Law
School. The Article is the work and opinion of the author and not necessarily the view of
the Conference or any of its bishop members. Mr. Chopko thanks Michael Moses for his
work, review, and comment on this Article.
1089
1090	 Boston College Law Review
	
(Vol. 44:1089
charitable immunity generally, and its limitation in virtually every ju-
risdiction, means that these entities must pay attention to their legal
relationships and conduct.'
For religious organizations there is another concern: that they
might be held responsible for the conduct of a member, employee, or
agent, or even the conduct of another related group or its members,
employees, or agents, including volunteers. Religious organizations
are sometimes very complex organisms. The largest consist of rela-
tions among tens of thousands of local churches, hundreds of re-
gional judicatories, and millions of adherents bound together not by a
contract of law but the bonds of a common commitment in faith.
They relate to each other and to national and international religious
bodies according to the dictates of religious principles and doctrines,
sometimes millennia old. It is most certainly not General Motors or
IBM. Even the smallest church bodies, a single church structure gov-
erned by a group chosen by the faithful, who call a pastor and follow
what they hear as the Lord's voice, is not analogous to a neighbor-
hood business. Indeed, analogies to the corporate world fail to cap-
ture the nature of religious institutions in the United States. Yet, the
dawn of the twenty-first century witnesses the continuation of the liti-
gation explosion of the last century, an explosion in which religious
institutions have routinely been made defendants in various actions.
The difficulty comes in identifying which entity properly is the defen-
dant and on what bases claims might lie against it.
It is undeniable that the scandals occurring in religious institu-
tions, especially Catholic dioceses and orders vigorously reported
throughout 2002 and 2003, have also had an effect on the perception
1
 In most states, charitable immunity is no longer available to preclude recovery. In
New Jersey, which preserves charitable immunity, a beneficiary of the charity may not
maintain an action in tort for the negligence of the entity and its personnel. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:53A7(a) (West 2000), Those who are not beneficiaries are not precluded from
recovery. Id. Compare Brown v. St. Venantius Sch., 544 A.2d 842, 843, 847-48 (N.J. 1988)
(reversing grant of summary judgment that denied recovery to plaintiff who was injured
when she fell on property abutting school because she was not a beneficiary at the time of
the injury), with Gray v. St. Cecilia's Sch., 526 A.2d 264, 265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1987) (affirming summary judgment that denied recovery because plaintiff, a mother
injured while picking up her son from school, was a beneficiary at the time of injury). In
recent times, four states, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Texas, pro-
vided a limited immunity related to caps on recovery. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K
(2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN, § 508:17 (Supp. 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-56-180 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 2002); Tlix. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2003).
More states immunize volunteers and volunteer boards by statute. See Volunteer Protection
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-14505 (2000).
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of the public, the press, and the courts in assessing the culpability, if
not the liability, of religious institutions. In some states, at this writing,
there are well-organized campaigns to narrow the defenses available
to charitable institutions that care for children, 2 strip all religious in-
stitutions of the confidentiality that is expected to attach to a commu-
nicant's penitential communications,3 and open private personnel
files for public rummaging. 4 Such is the state of litigation in 2003. Al-
though it is tempting to think that the scandal has ripened full blown
into open litigation season on religious institutions, most religious
institutions have reported an increase in litigation for many years 5 and
the situation today in the United States is but the latest example of
this phenomenon. In more recent times the task of allocating respon-
sibility, and then liability, and stating a sound and constitutional basis
on which the case may move forward has become more—not less—
complicated.
Consider this example.° A volunteer in a local church offers to
install a storm window on the church. It is the last window to be in-
stalled and, by coincidence, is on the very top story of the front of the
church. The ground is sloped, the ladder is old, the window is large,
and the volunteer is alone. On this particular windy Saturday, workiiig
many feet off the ground, the volunteer pushes the window (and him-
self) towards its space. As he does, the ladder moves, and he falls with
it to the ground. The volunteer is severely injured. Who is in the
wrong here?
A few more facts will muddy the water. The volunteer is a safety
engineer at a power plant. He has taken safety courses and has years
2 California has removed the statute of limitations for certain claims of sexual abuse
for one year. See CAL. C1V. Peat. Coiu § 340.1 (West Supp. 2003).
3 Kentucky and other states have attempted to strip religious bodies and their adher-
ents of all privileges of confidentiality that normally (and constitutionally) apply to confes-
sions of church members, if the conuntinicant confesses sexual abuse. See Peter Smith,
Lawmaker Tracks Clergy Abuse Cases: Bill Would Unseal Abuser's Confessions (Jan. 8, 2003), at
http://www.courierjou rnal.com/localsiews/ 2003/ 01/08/ke0108035345077.htm.
4
 As of January 2003, The Boston Globe has reported the files of 130 clergy accused of
sexual abuse. 5cc Michael Rezendes & Matt Carroll, 16 Priests Named for First Time in Sexual
Abuse Lawsuits, 11os -roN GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2003, at B6. available at http://www.bomon.com/
globe/spotlight/abuse/stories4/013003_suits.htm.
6 See Mark E. Chopko, Emerging Liability Issues in Non-Profit Organisations: An Overview,
CHARITY L. & PRAC. REV. 17, 18 (2002) (U.K.).
6 This hypothetical, which the author uses throughout this Article, is based on a real
case, Krider v. General Council on. Finance & Administration, Nos. 96-C-127, 96-G165 (N.H.
Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 1998). Information about this case was provided by the legal office of
the General Council on Finance and Administration, Evanston, Illinois (on file with au-
thor).
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of experience using ladders. He knows what he is doing and has vio-
lated every safety rule in the book. He tries to take his accident in
stride. He returns to work and has received substantial personal assis-
tance from members of his local church (they cook meals, they drive
him to medical appointments, they offer to help with expenses, etc.).
After all, he was helping his church. But, looking forward, he realizes
that his own savings might not be enough to allow him to cope with
future medical costs. He files suit. His lawyer studies the church struc-
ture and makes defendants of his local church, the ecclesiastical re-
gional body in which the local church is located, and the national de-
nominational body. The theory under which the ecclesiastical re-
gional and national bodies were named is that both bodies
occasionally offer workshops to local churches in risk management:
"Someone should have instructed the local church to assure that all
volunteers are well-trained before they are allowed to perform main-
tenance and certainly to use a spotter when a volunteer is working on
a ladder." In fact, the local church did send members to attend a risk
management. workshop in which common accidents in local churches
were covered, including falls, and there was an emphasis on training.
. On the eve of trial, the volunteer dismissed his local church from
the lawsuit. The case went to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor
of the national body but against the regional body. Allocating the fault
between the regional body and the volunteer, the volunteer received a
verdict of $783,000. At some point in the deliberations, the jury must
have concluded that the regional church was somehow the supervisor
of the local church on property maintenance matters. Its liability de-
rived from the actions, or more properly in this case the inactions, of
the local church.
An important reason why litigants may seek some form of liability
deriving from the actions of others turns on simple economics. It is
relatively easy for a plaintiff to establish that a particular individual
drove a vehicle negligently, or did not check to see what volunteers
were up to, or made a poor business judgment or otherwise acted im-
properly. It is sometimes easier to establish this layer of liability than
to establish the same kind of direct liability in an organization. Here,
no one from the local church was checking on the activities of our
claimant volunteer that Saturday. Because local churches depend on
the willingness of members to volunteer for tasks to hold down the
cost of operations and allow more funds for charity, the offer of a vol-
unteer to install that last window would not be remarkable; it would
be welcome. The local church might be the responsible defendant
here. But like many local churches, this one doesn't have many funds
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and there is still the reality that this church was very helpful to this
injured member. So one looks for other possible defendants, more
distant from the community with more assets, hence the naming of
the regional and national bodies. If one of those entities can be
forced to take responsibility for those actions committed by the mem-
ber or the leaders of the local church as if they were its own, then
financial recovery may be simpler.'
Yet a proper application of the body of law in this area shows that
ultimate success against his regional church body should have been
more problematic for this plaintiff. For courts trying to apply the law
rather than an instinct for justice, the subtleties of the law can be de-
ceptive. As shown below, liability depends on the nature of the con-
duct, its relationship to the community's mission, and the character of
the organization's operations. The effort to find an organization li-
able in these kinds of situations is called, in some circles, "ascending
liability." I believe the term "derivative liability" more accurately
reflects the law and the litigation experience. 8 An extremely complex
7 Sec Samuels v. S. Baptist Hosp., 594 So. 2d 571, 574, 576 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
no abuse of discretion in jury award of 1450,000 in damages against hospital and its insur-
ance company for the actions of one of the hospital's employees).
a "Derivative liability" is more than (and includes) respondeat superior liability. It may
even include ostensibly direct negligence claims that could not be asserted but for the
negligence or misconduct of another. Derivative liability encompasses efforts to follow
links in a denominational chain to impose responsibility in a coordinate or superior entity,
not just an "employing" entity. Several important works address in complete detail the
important facets of this topic. See generally EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR. & PHILIP C.
SORENSEN, ASCENDING LIABILITY IN RELIGIOUS AND OTHER NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
(Howard R. Griffin ed., 1984); Mark F. Chopko, Ascending Liability of Religious Entities for the
Actions of Others, 17 Asti. TRIAL AINOC. 289 (1993) [hereinafter Ascending Liability]; Mark
E. Chopko, Derivative Liability, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CHURCHES: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE IMPACT OF LEGAL STRUCTURES ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Craig B. Mousin ed.,
forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Derivative Liability]. Others would tend to distinguish
solely between vicarious and direct liability. "Derivative liability" as used here includes that
distinction but also applies in settings beyond traditional tort theories.
A thorough review of liability theory in various circumstances is found in 2 WILLIAM
W. BASsErrr, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW, chs. 7-8 (2002) (Chapter 7 is enti-
tled The Churches in Court Fundamentals in Litigation" and Chapter 8 is entitled
"Specific Causes of Action for Personal Injury/Criminal Liability of Churches") and Riot-
Am) It. HAMMAR, PASTOR, CHURCH & LAW, chs. 4, 10 (3d ed. 2000); see also Carl H. Esbeck,
Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment Considerations, 89
W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1986); David Frohlich, Note, Will Courts Make Change for a Large Denomina-
tion?: Problems of Interpretation in an Agency Analysis in Which a Religious Denomination Is In-
volved in an Ascending Liability Tort Case. 72 IOWA. L. REV. 1377 (1987). Given the space
limitations of this Symposium Issue, I refer the reader to the above texts and concentrate
here On a more narrow application of the legal theories by which religious institutions may
properly be joined as defendants.
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bundle of law and policy, "derivative liability" refers to the potential
institutional responsibility that rests on, and is derived from, the ac-
tions of others.
This Article reviews the theories under which liability might at-
tach to religious organizations for the actions of others, their employ-
ees or volunteers, or even the actions of related church entities.9 It
also examines selected areas of liability, attempting to distinguish be-
tween cases that may properly fall within accepted and ordinary liabil-
ity theory and those which seem outside. 1 ° Finally, it offers some cri-
tique of the efforts to rewrite traditional tort law as applied to relig-
ious institutions.
I. DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND
In its broadest sense, liability follows responsibility. The goal of
the claimant is to find some (solvent) defendant who can be forced to
take legal responsibility for the harm. The goal of the defendant is to
avoid the damages or, in multiparty cases, let the other defendants
take responsibility. Liability law attempts to sort out these demands
and ascertain fairly who should respond to the claim in damages. In
litigation involving more complex organizations like religious organi-
zations that have clustered together a variety of local, regional, and
national entities, all flying the banner Catholic, or Lutheran, or
Methodist, it is often the job of defense counsel to sort out the rela-
tionships to identify the "proper" defendant(s). "Derivative liability" is
an attempt to describe how liability law works, and should work, in
complex organizations. It provides a way for courts to navigate the
turbulent waters of complex cases to a fair resolution.
In this most basic sense, derivative liability encompasses tradi-
tional tort policy concepts, both financial risk-spreading and social-
reform goals. Indeed, social-reform and risk-spreading considerations
are behind decisions in which one entity must answer for the actions
of a related entity's minister, staff, or volunteer. This is more apparent
in attempts to force liability on larger national or regional groups
affiliated with smaller local groups. The courts presume that, if a "su-
perior" body, however defined or connected, can be forced to take
charge of the responsibility for the local matter, harm to future plain-
tiffs might be precluded. Thus, although this form of liability action
has at its root the most basic litigation urge to find a solvent or in-
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Part III.
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sured defendant, it also includes an element of social purpose, to en-
force some greater responsibility through the liability system and de-
ter future harm. The dilemma confronting the legal system is how
best to allocate responsibility among the parties.
Conversely, where a litigant seeks to force a religious defendant
to assume the legal responsibility for the misdeeds of a member, an
employee, a leader, or even another part of the larger religious or-
ganization, the fact that all the entities bear a name of a religious faith
does not make them all liable for the mistakes of everyone else. In an
extreme example, a group of plaintiffs sued the Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.), a civil corporation, and its national assembly, an ecclesiasti-
cal body, for damages occurring in the sexual assault of the claimants
by a minister who served in presbyteries (regional judicatories) in two
states." The theory of the case was that under the Book of Order, the
actions of one Presbyterian are supposed to be the actions of all, a
religious principle about solidarity and unity in the faith community. 12
In the hands of the plaintiffs' attorneys, the negligent acts of one were
the negligence of all Presbyterians. The trial court clearly saw the case
as an attempt to premise liability on a religious principle and dis-
missed through summary judgment on constitutional grounds." The
state supreme court affirmed but on the more narrow grounds that
the national church bodies had no knowledge at all of the minister
and under church rules would not be in a position to have done any-
thing about. it," Dismissal was the proper remedy. To have done oth-
erwise would have been to rewrite the polity.
Religious organizations organize themselves according to relig-
ious principle, vesting responsibilities in certain entities (a local
church for property issues, a national church for doctrine), and not
in others. Suing a local church over a doctrinal matter would be im-
proper even if constitutional; suing a national church because some-
one fell through the roof of a parish church is likewise not proper in
this example. Derivative liability describes how the law sorts out these
" See N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 594-95, 597 (Okla. 1999).
The defendants had initially filed this federal suit against the Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.), which is a corporation, and the assembly, which is not. When the court denied
certification of a defendant class,.the plaintiffs refiled the case against only the Presbyte-
rian Church (U.S.A.), which plaintiffs identified in the caption as an unincorporated asso-
ciation because they were using it as a surrogate for all Presbyterian entities. See id, at 592.
n See Plaintiffs' Petition at pt. V, paras. I—K, N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), No.
CJ 97-7006-61 (Dist. Ct. Okla. County 1997) (citing the Book of Order).
Sec N.H., 998 P.2d at 597.
14 Id. at 594, 598-601.
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cases. It reflects a good measure of corporate law and constitutional
principle.°
For some, to deny recovery based on immunity or corporate dis-
tinctions may seem artificial, unfair, or outdated. Religious entities,
like their secular counterparts, however, need the assurance that
"corporate" independence will be respected.° As my ladder example
notes, religious entities, to a greater extent than secular entities, rely
on the unbridled goodwill and good-faith efforts of volunteers to
make their operations run. Occasionally these entities seek to struc-
ture their operations as separate civil units to guard against the possi-
bility that another unit (or the whole body) might be made more vul-
nerable by the actions of an individual acting on its behalf or even
alone. Having chosen to plan operations in a particular way following
the dictates of the civil law, religious entities should not fear that these
"corporate" structures will be imploded in litigation."
When the individual actor who caused the damage was an agent
or employee (for example, in general terms, a minister or volunteer)
of a religious organization, there is inevitably an effort to pass the li-
ability to the religious organization that, in the broadest sense, "em-
ploys" the individual. In that sense, the liability may be shifted to the
institutional body. There may also be an effort to shift the liability to a
coordinate or superior ecclesiastical entity. In one case, the plaintiff
seeking damages for a personal injury sued the individual minister,
the local church, the church school, the regional ecclesiastical author-
ity, and the national and international bodies that were alleged to be
responsible for the affairs of the religious organization.° In this case,
the international organization and those who governed it were al-
18 See generally John S. Baker, Jr., Piosecuting Dioceses and Bishops, 94 B.C. L. REV. 1061
(2003).
38 See Plate v. St. Mary's Help of Christians Church, 520 N.W.2d 17, 19, 20-21 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1994) (affirming decision indicating diocese not vicariously liable for actions of
parish because parish was independent corporation).
17
 Such was the case in Barr v. United Methodist Church when a California court asserted
jurisdiction over the association of entities referred to as the "United Methodist Church"
for the obligations created by separately incorporated, but affiliated retirement homes. See
153 Cal. Rptr. 322, 324, 330-31 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 944 U.S. 973 (1979). That case
was wrongly decided. See Hope Lutheran Church v. Chellew, 460 N.E.2d 1244, 1247, 1248-
49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding no agency relationship existed between committee
formed to operate a retirement home and other Lutheran churches even though the
churches played a role in creating the committee); Ascending Liability, supra note 8, at 341.
18 See English v. Thorne, 676 F. Supp. 761, 761 (S.D. Miss. 1987). The literature
abounds with other examples in other denominations. E.g., Houston v. Mile High Advent-
ist Acad., 846 F. Supp. 1449 (D. Colo. 1999) (naming regional and national entities as co-
defendants); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (same).
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leged to be ultimately responsible for an injury suffered at a local
leve1. 19 It was up to the defendants to sort out the various layers of civil
responsibility.
To that extent, the term "ascending liability" (as used by com-
mentators) 20 most plainly denotes a hierarchical form of religious or-
ganization. 21 Authority and power are presumed to descend through
the various layers of the organization to the individual adherent.
Obedience is presumed to ascend through the organization with each
individual adherent or intermediate group presumably acting at the
behest of the next higher group in the organization. Ultimately, such
authority presumably resides in a religious superior or entity at the
top of the organizational chart. Using the "ladder" case as an exam-
ple, the duty to control the actions of the local church was alleged to
ascend through the hierarchical structure resting ultimately with the
national denominational leaders.
Indeed, civil responsibility does follow the discipline of ecclesial
principle through the various layers of the organization, but not hap-
hazardly or according to the pleadings of a claimant who may plead a
polity or a set of relationships that describe the church along lines
favorable to the claimed liability. In fact, as shown below, unless one
wants to violate both corporate and constitutional law, liability should
reside, if at all, in that entity which has both the juridic power (under
the polity of the religious organization) and the civil duty to answer
for the actions of individuals or organizations at a lower level in the
hierarchy.
to English, 676 F. Supp. at 762, 764 (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a
clahn that Vatican officials should answer for alleged abuse by a local priest); see also Pack-
age v. Holy See, No. 86-G222 (N.H. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 1988) (concluding Vatican officials
not responsible for hazard created by member of monastic community; leader of faith
community does not select followers). Additional cases are discussed in Parts II and
infra.
2° The term "ascending liability" appears in one reported decision, MacDonald v.
Maxwell, 655 N.E.2d 1249, 1250 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). The term appears in cites to
both GAFFNEY SC SORENSON, supra note 8 and Ascending Liability, supra note 8. Id.
21 Religious entities tend to fall into two dominant types—"hierarchical" or "congrega-
tional." Congregational bodies are fairly autonomous, self-governing local entities. 1 lins-
sErr, SUP717 note 8, ch. 3, § 3:3. They select or elect ministers and conduct their own affairs
with respect to doctrine and to worldly affairs with a high degree of independence. Sec id.
Hierarchical bodies are governed through "clerical" superiors, set in authority, over others.
See id, A form of polity between the two is sometimes called "connectional" or "presbyte-
rial." Id. In that form, local congregations are autonomous, but are affiliated through re-
gional or national groupings with a denominational identity. Sec id.; see also Guinn v.
Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 771-72 n.18 (Okla. 1989) (citing other authorities).
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This principle is also seen in litigation targeting related religious
corporate entities and ecclesiastical "coordinates" in congregational
or connectional polities. For example, in one instance the organizing
religious body was found liable for the unpaid bills of a senior citizen
center on the grounds that the superintendent of the center was the
agent of the religious en tity. 22
 These claims do not concern "superior,"
but "coordinate" religious organizations for the actions of separate
civil (even secular-appearing) corporations. Responsibility may shift
from one corporate entity to another even though they are in a more
"horizontal" relationship than entities in a hierarchical polity. Yet the
litigation effort to shift responsibility from one level to another in a
congregational body has all the trappings of litigation involving layers
of a hierarchical body and, for this reason, appears with cases in
which liability "ascends" or "descends," under the heading "derivative
liability."
Derivative liability applies in diverse factual settings involving all
forms of religious polity." Although most easily illustrated in tort
cases, for completeness, it should be noted that attempts to shift re-
sponsibility to another layer in the religious organization is seen in
cases involving the contracts or debts of its agents or employees, the
fraud or intentional misconduct (even crimes) committed by agents
or employees, and the actions of ministers in full accord with religious
doctrine. Furthermore, although the doctrine is most easily illustrated
by reference to incorporated religious bodies, following the various
ecclesial links in a civil corporate chain, it is also seen in efforts to
hold unincorporated religious associations, for the most part congre-
gational churches or synagogues, responsible for the conduct of a
member, staff or cleric, or agent. Indeed, changes in the statutory
treatment of unincorporated associations make it easier for these en-
tities to sue or be sued in their own name. 24 Therefore, it is easier for
"See Crest Chimney Cleaning Co. v. All Ezer Congregation, 310 N.Y.S.2d 217, 225-27
(Civ. Ct. 1970); see also Ruffin v. Temple Church of Cod in Christ, Inc., 749 A.2d 719, 722-
23 (D.C. 2000) (holding jury could reasonably conclude pastor had authority to cutter
church into a contract).
25
 There are even efforts to pierce the corporate veil to find adequate compensation in
particular cases. See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Piercing the Veil of Religious Organizations 1,
15 (paper presented at the ABA National Institute on Tort and Religion June 15, 1990)
(noting this form of litigation as example of derivative liability).
24 See Hanson v. St. Luke's United Methodist Church, 704 N.E.2d 1020, 1021, 1024-27
(Ind. 1998); Crocker v. Barr, 409 S.E.2d 368, 370-71 (S.C. 1991); Cox v. Thee Evergreen
Church, 836 S.W.2d 167, 168-69, 173 (Tex. 1992). These cases note state statutory changes
to allow litigation by or against unincorporated associations, among other things, to re-
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plaintiffs to have a defendant that is statutorily able to take responsi-
bility for the actions of individuals alleged to act in its name.
II. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE IMPOSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY 25
From the study of models of different church organizations,
whether incorporated or unincorporated, hierarchical or congrega-
tional, and the legal opinions governing liability, certain principles
emerge that unify a divergent and complex body of law. Cutting
across polities and corporate forms and governing the imposition of
responsibility (in the broadest sense), these principles describe the
circumstances under which liability may be shifted. Although the law
does not always admit of clarity, three general lines of inquiry appear,
and liability will not be imposed absent an affirmative finding that the
religious organization has exercised at least one of the following levels
of responsibility over the matter being litigated.
These three principles for the imposition of responsibility are:
1. Statutory or Corporate Responsibility (the civil organizing
or operational documents expressly place responsibility
for the matter disputed in a particular inferior, superior,
or coordinate group);
2. Denominational Responsibility (the ecclesial discipline of
the body expressly places responsibility in, or denies it to,
a particular group within the body); and
3. Situational Responsibility (notwithstanding the above
principles, a particular group has specifically involved it-
self in the underlying dispute or transaction giving rise to
the litigation).
Whether liability is ultimately proved such that the organization must
pay for the damage is a question which goes to the merits. Given the
high incidence of settlement, merely allowing the lawsuit to proceed
may cause an organization to make the prudential judgment to re-
solve a claim rather than either risk an adverse decision or expend its
resources in a defense. Thus, consideration of these principles under
which a claim for derivative liability may be stated is very important
move a bar to member lawsuits (known as the doctrine of imputed negligence). See Crocker,
409 S.E.2d at 370-371; Cox, 836 S.W.2d at 168-69,173.
25 Portions of this Part also appear in Ascending Liability, supra note 8, at pages 299-
309.
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for the ultimate resolution of a liability claim. This Part deals with
each of these areas in turn.
A. Statutory or Corporate Responsibility
Through its civil (as opposed to ecclesial) governing documents,
articles of incorporation or bylaws, policy or personnel manuals, or
similar documents, the coordinate or superior body may be held to
answer for claims if it has reserved to itself the authority over the mat-
ter in contention. Often this question is resolved under state statutory
or common law. In 1924, in Roman Catholic Archbishop u Industrial Ac-
cident Commission, the California Supreme Court held that the "Arch-
bishop of San Francisco, a Corporation Sole" was responsible for
workers' compensation claims of tradesmen injured on parish prop-
erty." A responsibility of the corporation sole was to hold title to real
property of the religious body. 27 In the opinion of the California Su-
preme Court, this responsibility included the necessary power to
make arrangements for its maintenance and repair, such that the ac-
tion of an individual pastor was attributable to the corporation.28 The
corporation was estopped from denying its ultimate responsibility for
such matters. 29 The court viewed its holding as an unremarkable ap-
plication of the California law authorizing religious corporations."
Conversely, where there is no legal basis to impute the matter in
dispute to the power and authority of the corporation, the corpora-
tion may be dismissed from an action. For example, in an action
which sought damages for a sexual assault, a corporation sole, organ-
ized under the laws of Rhode Island, was dismissed through summary
judgment. 8i Plaintiffs had contended that the bishop conducted all
priestly supervision through the corporation sole and therefore the
corporation sole (which also presumably held the assets) should be
responsible for the control and direction of the negligent priest."
The bishop responded that under the 1900 legislation that allowed
26 230 P. 1, 1-2, 8 (Cal. 1924).






at Doe v. O'Connell, No. PC 86-0077, 1989 NiTIL 1110566, at *1 (R.1. Super. Ct. Nov. 21,
1989).
32
 See id.; sce also EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 77 F. Stipp. 2d 71, 75, 78
(D.D.C. 1999) (setting forth that parish, as part of corporation sole, lacked legal capacity
to be sued).
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the creation of a corporation sole, the legislature provided that the
corporation sole had no ability to control or supervise the functioning
of the individual priests." Rather, as a creature of state law, the corpo-
ration sole had specifically limited powers relating to the purchase,
holding, and conveyance of property for religious purposes." The
court agreed," and dismissed the corporation from the litigation
through summary judgment."
Although more easily illustrated by reference to large hierarchi-
cal religious bodies organized along corporate lines, the same result is
seen in litigation involving single congregations. For example, in a
case arising in congregational polity, a court rejected a writ of execu-
tion against real property held by a person, not as an individual, but
in his capacity as "presiding apostle" of a church, a corporation sole. 37
The appellate court indicated that the assets of the corporation sole
are not the "personal assets of its titular head," and therefore could
not be used to satisfy personal debts." Even in these polities the
courts distinguish between personal/ecclesial and civil/corporate
powers.
" See O'Connell, 1989 WL 1110566, at *1.
s Id.
" See id. at *1, 3. To the same effect is Plate n. St. Mary's Help of Christians Church. See 520
N.W.2d 17, 19, 20-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). In that case, the court affirmed dismissal,
through directed verdict, of a diocesan corporation from a wrongful death case holding
that the action complained of was vested by corporate form in a separate entity, the local
parish church. See id. at 18, 20-21. In the secular world, related but separate entities rely
an separate incorporation to limit liability, and courts do not look behind them except for
compelling and narrowly restricted reasons. E.g., Tatum v. Everhart, 954 F. Stipp. 225, 228-
30 (D. Ran. 1997) (concluding mere membership in United Way was insufficient to create
single employer for Title VI1 liability purposes). The same result should occur in the case
of religious entities. Black v, Cardinal McCloskey Children's & Family Servs., No. 17865-96
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 11, 2000) (concluding legally related but separate entity was not liable
for other's tort).
36 O'Connell, 1989 WL 1110566, at *1. The court relied on cases from other jurisdic-
tions reaching the same conclusion on other facts in both the tort and the contract area.
Sec id. at *2-3. Among the cases relied upon is Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Superior Court.
See 93 Cal. Rptr. 338, 340, 341-42 (Ct. App. 1971) (determining contract for purchase of
St. Bernard dog with Swiss Abbey not enforceable against Archbishop of San Francisco;
Catholic organizations are separate civil entities).
57 County of San Luis Obispo v. Ashurst, 194 Cal. Rptr. 5, 5 (Ct. App. 1983).
" Id. at 6, 8. A Canadian case recently reached the same conclusion holding that a
bishop was not personally liable for the mistakes of a predecessor but the corporation sole
might be. Doe v. Bennett (2002), 215 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 310 at para. 9 (Nfld. S.C. (C.A.)),
2002 NFCA 47, leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, [2003] WI., 13731 (WL).




Denominational responsibility has as its starting point whether, in
ecclesial documents or expressions of authority, the coordinate or su-
perior body proposed as a defendant has reserved authority over the
matter in dispute to itself. In other words, does the entity reserve to
itself the authority to supervise or resolve the particular matter at the
center of the dispute? Ecclesiastical control is not always identical to
civil control, meaning that the control exercised by the related reli-
gious entity rests on the consent or adherence of the other person or
entity to religious doctrine. Although the judicial development of this
principle involves courts in the close scrutiny of discipline of the body
itself, often this scrutiny is invited by the religious entity which has
pleaded its governing ecclesial documents as a means to avoid ulti-
mate responsibility for the matter in dispute. Courts here walk a fine
constitutional line.
Illustrating this principle is Eckler u General Council of the Assemblies
of God.59
 In this case, in 1990, the Court of Appeals of Texas ruled that
regional and national church bodies were not liable to answer in tort
for damages resulting from the actions of a minister teaching at a
school operated by a local 'church affiliated with the denomination:to
No relationship existed between the local church and the denomina-
tion's General Council under the church's organizational structure
sufficient to warrant the imposition of liability.'" The constitution and
bylaws of the denomination itself gave a District Council (an interme-
diate structure) the responsibility for the selection and endorsement
of prospective ministers.42
 Those documents also gave the authority to
investigate, file charges, and conduct hearings on alleged allegations
of misconduct to the District Council 43
 Because each individual local
church was self-governing, the General Council of the Assemblies of
God had no civil duty, based on an asserted ecclesial right, to super-
vise or control their internal affairs.'" Even though the General
Council would ordain and license ministers, their actual supervision
would be in the hands of local churches or, at most, a District Coun-
32
 784 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. App. 1990).
44 See id. at 936-37, 939-41.
41 Sec id. at 938-41.
42 Id. at 938.
42 See id. at 938-39; see also Doe v. Cunningham, 30 F.3d 879, 883-84 (7th Cir. 1994)
(concluding undisputed facts showed clergy supervision was vested in church body not
named in litigation).
44 See Eckler, 784 S.W.2d at 941.
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 Indeed, when a complaint is made about ministerial misconduct,
the complaint is referred to the appropriate District Council rather
than the General Council for investigation and disciplinary action."
Liability for failure to take disciplinary actions creating a risk of future
misconduct would follow the denomination's decision to vest such
responsibility in a particular entity, and not be spread throughout the
denomination generally or its national institution. 47
In 1999, in N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court resolved a dispute about the authority of the national
body of the Presbyterian Church to have responsibility for the mis-
conduct of individual ministers on the basis of the absence of knowl-
edge in the national body." It might also have resolved the case ac-
cording to the principle that the power to supervise and discipline
Presbyterian ministers resided in the first instance with the regional
bodies, the presbyteries. To have held that the national body had
powers beyond its charter and the Church's Book of Order would
have been incorrect and unconstitutional.
Churches fix the authority or lack thereof for specific tasks in
particular church entities. It is well settled that the power to engage in
this kind of self-governance is beyond the constitutional power of the
civil courts and authorities. 49 If the state lacks the authority to dictate
how a religion is organized and governed, it follows that the courts
may not allow a claim to proceed on the false or erroneous assertion
of ecclesiastical power in some body, or on the notion that some relig-
ious doctrine "must" provide for this kind of claim. 50 For example, if a
party pleaded that the Catholic Church was a corporate monolith, or
even a General Motors, and attempted to fix liability for a particular
harm occurring in one local church on the whole faith community,
that set of facts is subject to attack and the claim subject to dismissal as
unconstitutional. There is no rule that requires false facts to be taken
as true on a motion to dismiss when thê consequence is allowing for
an unconstitutional assertion of judicial power over a fictitious relig-
45 See id. at 938.
4° See id.
47 See Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 748, 758 (Ct.
App. 1992) (concluding regional body not liable for misconduct because local body pos-
sessed hiring authority); Dewaard v. United Methodist Church, 793 So. 2d 1038, 1040-41
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding regional body liable for supervision, local church
dismissed).
48 See 998 P.2d 592, 594, 600-01 (Okla. 1999).
49 Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
5° See id.
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ious polity. On the contrary, in 2002, in Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the propriety of such
constitutional assertions should be raised on motions to dismiss with
the burden of proof shifting to plaintiffs 51
 Otherwise, a religious or-
ganization's constitutional right to self-governance could easily be vio-
lated 52
Conversely, where polities do place the denominational responsi-
bility or supervision in the hands of a larger regional or other govern-
ing body, liability may attach to this body. For example, in Olson v.
Magnuson, the Evangelical Covenant Church of America, an Illinois
corporation, was named as a defendant in a complaint for its alleged
failure to supervise adequately one of its ministers serving at an
affiliated church in Minnesota. 53
 The national church body unsuccess-
fully moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. 54 On
appeal the appellate court noted that the bylaws of the national
church specifically provided for the formation of a "board of minis-
try" to supervise the conduct of, license, investigate, and discipline its
ministers.55 Because the national church had held itself responsible
for investigating claims of impropriety lodged against local church
ministers and administering any discipline, the court found, from the
church's own rules and regulations, that the national church body
should be held to answer for the claimed misconduct. 55 Although par-
51
 773 N.E.2d 929, 938 (Mass. 2002).
52
 The problem of proof in these cases is delicate. Often it is the religious body that of-
fers evidence of its religious doctrine as proof that it lacks the claimed responsibility over
the subject matter of the lawsuit. Such disputes should be resolved in limine, with the
benefit of the doubt going to the religious body. If there is a legitimate doubt in the
court's mind, then resort should be made to existing mechanisms within the church body
to resolve the claim. It should be emphasized that, if a court is so heavily invested in decid-
ing the legitimacy of a claim by attempting to resolve a dispute among trained experts in
the law, practice and polity of a religion, serious questions must exist as to the constitu-
tionality of the claim in the first instance.
55
 457 N.W.2d 394,395 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). In one of six cases arising from the
misconduct of Reverend Magnuson, a jury returned a verdict in excess of $1 million;
$200,000 against Rev. Magnuson and nearly $900,000 against the local church. See NAT'L
14, June 14, 1993, at 6. The report does not say what occurred with respect to the national
body. See id.
54 Olson, 457 N.W.2d at 395.
55 Id.
56 See id. at 397. The court also concluded, however (in implicit accord with Eekler, 784
S.W.2d at 937) that mere membership in a national religious organization was not enough
to confer jurisdiction over that national group to answer for a tort committed in a lo61
church. See id.; see also Glover v. Boy Scouts of Am., 923 P.2d 1383, 1384, 1387-88 (Utah
1996) (concluding that issuing of guidelines and suggestions by the national association
and local council did not amount to control over the day-to-day activities of the local
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titular constitutional considerations need to be evaluated in these cir-
cumstances,57 generally the religious entity itself has invited a court to
consider its governing documents to avoid responsibility.
The mere potential to exercise ecclesial discipline is not
sufficient to impose liability. The governing body must either assert or
reserve authority over the particular matter in question. For example,
to assert liability against a church for a deliberate personal injury
committed by a minister, it is not enough that the church has exer-
cised general ecclesial discipline or offered some general statements
of concern. There must be some connection between the particular
expression of ecclesial discipline and the particular matter in dis-
pute. 58 The mere right to control conduct generally for ecclesiastical
group). Something more than a potential interest or authority must be shown. Sec Nye v.
Kemp, 646 N.E.2d 262, 264-65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). Similarly, ecclesiastical supervisory
authority can have civil law consequences when it is expressly reserved. See Does v. Cotnp-
Care, Inc., 763 P.2d 1237, 1241-44 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). In Does to CompCare, Inc. a
Catholic bishop in Louisiana was held answerable to a claim for damages in Washington
because he continued to exercise ecclesial discipline over a suspended priest who was then
in residence in Washington. See id. at 1239, 1243-44. The continued denominational rela-
tionship between the bishop and the priest provided sufficient links such that jurisdiction
could be fairly asserted. See id. at 1241-44; sec also Johnston v. United Presbyterian Church
in the United States, Inc., 431 N.E.2d 1275, 1280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding Church had
sufficient control over relationship at local level to meet personal jurisdiction require-
ment).
57 The possibility of scrutiny of internal matters always raises the prospect of unconsti-
tutional entanglement. Sec Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the United States & Canada v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09 (1976). It would also invite a court to scrutinize stan-
dards, policies, and actions (or the lack thereof) in violation of free exercise rights. See
Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 987-88 (Okla. 1992) (setting forth that free exercise also
protects church autonomy in tort litigation). For this reason, courts usually determine
polity-dependent questions if they can be answered without intrusion. See Werling v. Grace
Evangelical Lutheran Church, 987 N.E.2d 990, 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). Courts routinely
forbid litigation over internal religious matters and bar the civil enforcement of religious
duties. See Phillips v. Marist Soc'y, 80 F.3d 274, 275 (8th Cir. 1996); Franco v. Church of
Jesus Christ of Litter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 203, 205-06 (Utah 2001). But there is no
constitutional barrier to a court making an inquiry and a determination of the authority
(or more likely, the lack of authority) in a religious entity, when invited by that entity on a
motion to dismiss. Rashedi v. Gen. Ed. of Church of the Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349, 352, 353,
354-55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (remanding for fact finding because manuals unclear as to
division of responsibility).
5a For example, in Malloy v. Fong, the California Supreme Court held a regional pres-
bytery liable for personal injuries suffered in a car accident at a local mission church. 232
P.2d 291, 245, 255 (Cal. 1951). The presbytery had asserted the actions of the local church
ministers were beyond their supervision. Sec id. at 245. But relying on ecclesial documents
the court rejected that proposed limitation, noting that in the Presbyterian Church, pres-
byteries enjoyed a higher degree of direct supervision in a mission church than in a fully
functioning (and therefore autonomous) congregation. See id. at 248-49. Because the
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purposes does not make a religious body civilly responsible for all of
the actions of any person related to it. As one court explained: "If ec-
clesiastic control is to be sufficient, the Holy See would be exposed to
limitless liability for any tortious acts by individuals who choose to
commit themselves to the church's religious calling." 59 Should ecclesi-
astical direction be manifest in the actions of the individual, there is
little doubt under the principles established above that a higher ec-
clesial body would at least be held to answer in such a case in order to
discern whether in fact it was negligent.
C. Situational Responsibility
The third principle for the imposition of responsibility shows that
liability may be asserted even in the absence of secular statutory or
corporate responsibility over the matter in question, and in the ab-
sence of denominational authority to resolve the matter being liti-
gated. The actual conduct of an organization can cause it to become
involved situationally in the matter in review. For charitable institu-
tions occupied with righting wrongs and doing justice, the temptation
to become involved in the affairs of some related part of the religious
organization, notwithstanding the lack of civil or ecclesial authority to
do so, is sometimes too great to bear.
For example, in 1990, in &Hen" the Court of Appeals of Texas
scrutinized the record to ascertain whether, notwithstanding the limi-
tations in the governing documents, the General Council had in-
volved itself in the situation sufficiently so as to be fairly subject to
suit. 61
 In this case the court found no record that the General Council
even knew that a complaint had been made against the local minis-
ter.62 The record also established, without dispute, that had the Gen-
church placed that control in the presbytery, the presbytery was the proper defendant. See
id.
59
 Package v. Holy See, No. 86-C-222, slip op. at 6 (N.H. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 1988). In
fact, the court found that, notwithstanding ecclesiastical law, the religious body really does
not "have the opportunity to control [their followers') acts so as to prevent harm to oth-
ers." Id. at 6-7. In Package, plaintiffs sued the international governing body for Catholics to
compensate them for an automobile accident caused by the action of one individual
monk. Id. at 6; accord M.L. v. Civil Air Patrol, 806 F. Stipp. 845, 848-49 (E.D. Mo. 1992)
(national entity not responsible for personnel decision at local level); NH., 998 P.2d at
600-01 (holding national organization not liable because it did not have knowledge of the
acts of the minister); see Plate, 520 N.W.2d at 20-21 (concluding diocese not responsible
for actions of parish, which was separate corporation).
69 See supra notes 39•47 and accompanying text.
611 See 784 S.W.2d at 938-39.
62 See id.
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eral Council become aware of such a complaint made against the lo-
cal minister, the matter would have been referred to the District
Council for resolution.° Thus, the case implies situational responsibil-
ity as a separate governing principle for the assertion of derivative li-
ability. When justified by the record, courts specifically determine
whether a coordinate or superior body has so insinuated itself in a
particular set of actions in the related entity that it can rightly be held
in the given case as a defendant and therefore risk ultimate liability.
Conversely, even where an organization has insinuated itself into
a situation, its liability is dependent on the liability of its agents. For
example, where a religious organization has engaged itself in the
placement of children for foster care and ultimate adoption, its liabil-
ity for damages for injuries arising out of these placements derives
from the actions of the individuals with whom children were placed.
In 1989, in LDS Social Service Corp. v. Richins, the Georgia Court of Ap-
peals held that the religious corporation was not liable, as a matter of
law, where no liability had been found in the actions of the foster par-
ents who had oversight of the child when the child was injured. 64
 This
principle should be understood as a rule of caution. When no statu-
tory or denominational basis on which liability may fairly shift other-
wise exists, a court may nonetheless seek just results in particular cases
by scrutinizing the underlying transaction for actual involvement, not
in the general subject matter, but in the specific situation that is the
subject of the complaint.
The above liability principles—statutory/corporate responsibility,
denominational responsibility, and situational responsibility—are not
mutually exclusive. Each functions in the alternative, though an
affirmative answer on any one level of inquiry can be enough to hold
a defendant in a case. As illustrated above, these principles cut across
denominational, corporate, organizational, and polity lines. Illustra-
63 Sec id. at 938; see also Doe v. New London Ass'n of the United Church of Christ, No.
CV9905511813, 2001 WL 83883 at *2 (Conn. Super Ct. Jan. 12, 2001) (finding no legal
duty owed to parishioner by Association); Evan F, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836-37 (holding neg-
ligent hiring does not carry over to those who are a step removed, i.e., those who are vic-
tims of the violin of the negligently hired employee); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450,
461 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding summary judgment for defendant proper on grounds
that procedure by which international church could have acted not invoked).
" See 382 S.E.2d 607, 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); see also Osborne v. Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911
(Ky. 2000) (affirming grant of summary judgment for diocese because no evidence was
presented that priest had a history of misconduct or that diocese had knowledge that
priest might engage in sexual misconduct, and therefore there was no support for an in-
dependent negligence claim).
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dons of how these principles apply in given situations are discussed in
the next Part.
M. APPLICATIONS
Examining how the above principles apply in decided tort cases
shows that most courts in fact reach decisions consistent with them.
Although religious institutions must also be measured by what the
U.S. Constitution permits, there is no general barrier to the adjudica-
tion of tort claims through the First Amendment. 65 In each area of law
that follows, these principles make for order and the hobgoblin, con-
sistency, in the chaotic world of torts.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior an employer or mas-
ter is liable for the torts committed by employees or agents within the
scope of their duties. For liability to shift (in those cases not involving
direct negligence), the plaintiff must prove both aspects of a two-part
test. First, the person who committed the tort must be found to be the
agent, employee, or servant in a relationship with the religious or-
ganization. Even if a relationship can be established, without negli-
gence in the actor, no derivative organizational responsibility can be
placed." Second, the activity in question must be determined to be
within the scope of duties the person was to perform, or a foreseeable
consequence of that person's normal activities in the task. As liability
is asserted to higher or coordinate bodies, the principles articulated
in Part II above are employed. Torts are claimed for actions which are
sometimes contrary to religious doctrine, 67 sometimes in accord with
religious doctrine," and sometimes on which religious doctrine has
no bearing."
65 Rashedi v. Gen. Bd. of Church of the Nazarene, 59 P.Sd 399, 352-53 (Ariz. Ct, App.
2002)
e6 See LDS Soc. Serv. Corp. v. Richins, 382 S.E.2d 607, 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); see also
Schleifer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Neb. 1993) (finding no direct
negligence in a corporate defendant without negligence on the part of the individual
cleric).
67 See Marco C. v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 5 Civ. No. F3610 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 29,
1985) (sexual assault).
68 See Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875. 876 (9th Cir.
1987) (shunning).
69 See Ambrosio v. Price, 495 F. Supp. 381, 383 (D. Neb. 1979) (automobile accident).
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A. Accident Cases
The process by which one assesses responsibility for an accident
involving a volunteer or employee of a religious body is normally
straightforward. For example, if a staff member driving a church vehi-
cle causes an accident on the way to or from a field trip, or a custo-
dian fails to correct hazardous conditions on or near the property, the
employing entity, even though a church, may be responsible. Such
cases turn on a policy determination that the employee or supervising
entity, even though a religious organization, has not only the oppor-
tunity, but the duty, to address hazardous conditions and address
them properly.70
The complicating features in this area of the law occur when li-
ability is asserted against related church entities. For example, in the
ladder case noted above, the original defendants included the local
church and regional and national judicatories. In maintenance-of-
property cases or control-of-volunteer cases, the primary focus, in fact,
is the local church entities. Neither regional nor national bodies have
an opportunity, much less the right, to control the actions of individ-
ual volunteers doing specific maintenance tasks of local churches.
The verdict against the regional body, however much motivated out of
the sense of justice or concern for the volunteer injured, cannot be
sustained by any analysis under ordinary derivative liability principles,
unless the regional body maintained some form of direct control over
the use and maintenance of property or insinuated itself into local
property matters. 71 It. is unclear whether the volunteer in question
even could have received compensation from his local church. 72
A case raising similar concerns was reversed on appeal. 75 A jury
had found that a regional ecclesiastical body was the supervisor of a
local Episcopal church and ultimately responsible for damages caused
by a vestryman who injured his own son while performing voluntary
7D See, e.g., John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist, 769 P.2d 948, 953-55 (Cal. 1989).
71 But see Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Industrial Accident Commission where the property
managing entity that was held liable was the regional judicatory corporation sole. See 230 P.
1, 2, 8 (Cal. 1924).
72 Fisher v. Northmoor United Methodist Church, 679 S.W.2d 305, 306-07 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) (finding church had no duty to warn invitee doing volunteer work where vol-
unteer helped create the dangerous condition). See Cottam V. First Baptist Church, 756 F.
Stipp. 1433, 1438-39 (D. Colo. 1991) (indicating no liability in local church when volun-
teers act gratuitously and outside the control of the church), alp, 962 F.2d 17 (10th Cir.
1992).
73 See Folweil v. Bernard, 477 So. 2d 1060, 1062-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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gardening work for his own local church community. 74 The jury
found the negligence of both the volunteer and the local church
could be attributed to the Episcopal diocese.76 The District Court of
Appeal reversed, holding that the diocesan church, through denomi-
national documents as well as civil statutes, exercised neither civil nor
ecclesiastical control over the local church in the area of property
maintenance to allow for an assertion of an agency relationship. 76
 The
temporal affairs of the local church, including the maintenance of
property, were in the hands of the local church, which alone was re-
sponsible for the actions and negligence of its employees and volun-
teers." Reviewing the record, the appellate court determined that the
diocese had not insinuated itself into the conduct of maintenance ac-
tivities of the local church such that the imposition of liability could
be justified. 78 The jury verdict was set aside. 79
Another issue which continues to occur from time to time is the
doctrine that some have termed "canonical agency." Under this doc-
trine, every activity of a member of the clergy, all day, every day, is at-
tributable to his or her ecclesiastical superior.86 Without deciding
74 See id. at 1061-62.
See id. at 1062.
76 See ed. at 1063.
77 See id.; see also Nye v. Kemp, 646 N.E.2d 262, 264-65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (finding
regional body not liable because of lack of control). The assertion of control becomes
indefensible when one sues the national or international governing body of a religious
organization alleging that those in charge are responsible in tort for the carelessness of
individual members or ministers. The heads of these organizations do not choose their
members (the members choose the organizations for doctrine, practices, and a variety of
other reasons) and rarely do those in charge pass on the ministry credentials of each indi-
vidual performing services around the globe. Compare Olson V. Magnuson, 457 N.W.2d
394, 397 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), with Package v. Holy See, No. 86•G222, slip op. at 5-7
(N.H. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 1988).
76 See Falwell, 477 So. 2d at 1063. A state appellate court in Doe u Roman Catholic Church
listed factors that could be evaluated to determine if a charity volunteer was acting gratui-
tously or subject to sufficient direction to be considered an agent of the religious entity. See
615 So. 2d 410, 415 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 'The right to control is a fact question, deter-
mined by the following questions: (1) the degree of contact between the charity and the
volunteer, (2) the degree to which the charity orders the volunteer to perform specific
actions, and (3) the structural hierarchy of the charity." Id. The court in Roman Catholic
Church found that, had the jury been properly instructed, it might have concluded that the
leader of the youth organization was not a servant of the church. Id. at 412, 415.
79 See Falwell, 477 So. 2d at 1063.
80 See Stevens v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 123 Cal. Rptr. 171, 175-77 (Ct. App. 1975).
Each of the experts who were divided over whether such a form of agency was possible has
earned his own place in the life of the law and the Catholic Church in California. Plain-
tiff's expert was John Noonan, now Judge of the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
the defense expert was Roger Mahony, now Cardinal Archbishop of Los Angeles. For me,
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whether such a claim of agency is constitutionally proper, most courts
have routinely rejected such a broad notion of agency as inconsistent
with the general law of the jurisdiction. As stated by the Kansas Su-
preme Court, if a person is conducting his business through others,
"he is bound to manage them so third persons are not. injured."81 This
rule is therefore "'a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk.'" 82
Although a religious leader may have substantial ecclesiastical control
over the comings and goings of individual ministers, that control does
not include all day-to-day activities of the minister, such as whom he
might visit and when. 83
B, Misconduct Cases
Abuse of minors and the exploitation of vulnerable adult counse-
lees are two of the more difficult areas of liability for religious entities.
These actions are rightly condemned as possibly criminal (depending
on the age of the victim), possibly creating liability (depending on
whether the person legally could give consent) but always sinful and
wrong. The areas of liability generally do not involve respondeat su-
perior liability, as almost every court holds, correctly, that a sexual as-
sault is not part of the expected duties of a minister or other person
serving a religious entity. There are a variety of theories in which li-
ability is asserted against a religious entity, or even against a series of
related entities, sounding in negligence, however: hiring, retention,
supervision, and fiduciary duty. These liability theories occasionally
flirt with the constitutional boundary between church and state when
the evidence on which the claim depends is a religious doctrine or
principle, or when the claim involves the courts in critiquing policies
or doctrine rooted in religious values or teaching, or when a secular
yardstick is proposed by which to measure the activities of religious
leaders.
the issue is why the court allowed the battle of canonical experts over the degree of super-
vision a bishop had over the social activities of an individual priest and why the issue was
not dealt with in limine, possibly through reference to Catholic Church agencies, to re-
solve that question definitively.
ei Brillhart v. Scheier, 758 P.2d 219, 221 (Kan. 1988).
82 Id. at 222 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET Al.., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 69 (5th ed. 1984)).
as See Rrilitiart, 758 P.2d at 223; Nye, 646 N.E.2d at 264; Glover v. Boy Scouts of Am., 923
P.2d 1383, 1388 (Utah 1996).
1112	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 44:1089
1. Is There Clergy Malpractice?
The short answer is "no." The longer answer engages the ques-
tion of the appropriate role of courts and the relationships that exist
between ecclesial defendants.
Courts have universally rejected claims of clergy malpractice. 84
One cannot sue a minister for failing to discharge duties defined by
church law, doctrine, or practice. For example, one cannot sue a min-
ister for bad sermons, poor counsel, poorly-led worship, or a misin-
terpretation of scripture, because the criteria by which one judges a
minister's sermon, counsel, liturgical skills, or scriptural interpreta-
tion are decidedly religious and ecclesial, and hence outside the con-
stitutional orbit of government. For the government to impose special
duties on persons simply by virtue of their ministerial or ecclesial
status would amount to a special disability on religion, a targeting of
religion for disadvantageous treatment, which is constitutionally im-
permissible.85
 just as the government cannot establish the
qualifications of ministers , 88 it cannot enforce ministerial qualifications
by providing a remedy when ministers fall short of them. It makes no
difference whether the creation and enforcement of ecclesial or min-
isterial duties is attempted by a legislature or by a court, for the First
Amendment operates as a limitation on all of government, not just on
one branch.°
The constitutional issues at stake here are clear from the perspec-
tive of intrusion of the secular state into setting standards for ministry.
The secularization of ministry through the importation of secular
workplace standards and yardsticks by which to measure performance
are a sufficiently grave infringement 88 that a separate cause of action
84 See Destefano v Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 285 (Colo. 1988) ("To date, no court has
acknowledged the existence of a tort" of clergy malpractice); Roppolo v. Moore, 644
So. 2d 206, 208 (La. Ct. App. 1999) ("To date, no court has acknowledged the existence of
a separate cause of action for the malpractice of a clergy member while acting within a
clerical capacity."); Greene v. Roy, 604 So. 2d 1359, 1362 (La. Ct. App. 1992) ("There are
no jurisdictions in the United States that have established a cause of action for clerical
malpractice."); Schleifer, 508 N.W.2d at 911 ("So far as we have been able to determine, no
jurisdiction to date has recognized a claim for clergy malpractice.").
85 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 596-47
(1993); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978).
86 See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929).
87 See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am.,
363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960).
88
 See Destefano, 763 P.2d at 290 (Quinn, CJ., concurring) (indicating that subjecting
clergy to same standards as marriage counselors or licensed psychologists would endanger
that which makes religious, as opposed to secular, counseling desirable).
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Jeffrey Scott E. v. Central Baptist Church reflects the overwhelming
majority rule that religious organizations are not liable for sexual as-
saults committed by those who minister for them under the doctrine
of respondeat superior." Such actions are not only unforeseeable but
they violate the very things held sacred by the church. Arguments that
ministers routinely have access to vulnerable persons and minors be-
cause they can exploit positions of trust have not persuaded courts to
alter this majority rule 9 1 In only one jurisdiction have the courts
adopted a different view of vicarious liability, holding that juries may
assess, as a question of fact, the degree to which the person was acting
for his own selfish or criminal motives as opposed to acting for his re .-
ligious employer.92
In these times, it is not likely that a jury, when given such a case,
will find that a person acted entirely out of his own selfish designs un-
less the evidence is overwhelming and clear. This extreme version of
vicarious liability must therefore be seen as a rule approaching strict
liability, reflecting a policy that the vulnerable deserve an extraordi-
nary protection against the supposedly dangerous people who are al-
89 In reaching this conclusion, I put off for another day the discussion of identifying
the proper standard-setting defendant and the proper supervising defendant if there is to
be a tort of clergy malpractice. For example, would there be a cause of action against the
religious body that writes the Book of Discipline or Code of Canon Law for failure to an-
ticipate a departure from ministerial expectations? Such a cause further complicates both
the tort and the constitutional pictures.
49 See 243 Cal. Rptr, 128, 130, 131-32 (Ct. App. 1988).
91 Sec Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church, 869 F. Stipp. 429, 433-34 (E.D. La. 1993),
affd, 32 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1429 (7th Cir.
1994) (Coffey,J., concurring); id. at 1436 (Ripple, J., concurring).
92 Sec Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1166-67 (Or. 1999). In Fearing, the court noted
that sexual assault on a minor is not part of the scope of duty of a cleric. Sec id. at 1166.
The court opened the door to pleading a cause of action in respondeat superior, however,
when the plaintiff states facts that, if true, show that the perpetrator was acting within the
scope of his duty when he committed acts that led to the acts that caused the injury. Sec id.
In other words, the court may allow a claim for the deceit of a pastor that allowed him
access to a minor if ministry to young adults is part of his official duties. See id. at 1166-67.
It will be difficult to maintain the line between official acts and the abandonment of those
acts. This rule is a departure from the rules previously applied by courts and contrary to
other decisions. See, e.g., Jeffrey Scott E., 243 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31.
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lowed to minister in religious organizations in the United States today.
The better view is that criminal impulsive and abusive behavior, con-
trary to religious teaching and law, is not even remotely in the service
of the religion. Such personal acts bar a cause of action here.
b. Negligent Hiring and Retention
Far more likely are claims based around negligent hiring, reten-
tion, and supervision. These claims depend for success on the exis-
tence of antecedent knowledge in the possession of religious superi-
ors who were in a position to act on the knowledge so as to have pre :-
vented the sexual misconduct from occurring. Just stating the
question indicates the number of potential difficulties in asserting this
kind of liability consistent with the U.S. Constitution.
Some courts reason that the First Amendment "does not grant
religious organizations absolute immunity from tort liability,"95 which
is trite but not helpful because it fails to address the question of when
such organizations are immune from tort liability or whether liability
is appropriate under the precise circumstances of the case under re-
view. Other courts employ the familiar Reynolds v. United States distinc-
tion94 between belief and acts. 95 This too is unhelpful because it fails
to consider the circumstances in which conduct is constitutionally
protected and fails to distinguish those circumstances from others.
Plainly a constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion must pro-
tect at least some conduct against government intrusion. The be-
lief/acts distinction only skirts the problem. Still other courts reason
that negligent hiring claims require no inquiry into religious beliefs. 9a
If this were true, it would be insufficient to prove justiciability. 97 Oth-
erwise, many employment discrimination claims by ministers could be
decided by courts, at least when the defending church agrees that it
does not discriminate on the basis alleged by the plaintiff or asserts
93 Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 319 (Colo. 1993).
94
 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
95 Moses, 863 P.2d at 319.
98 Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315:1323-24 (Colo. 1996).
97
 Government action need not burden a specific religious belief or practice, or re-
quire interpretation of church doctrine, to violate a church's claim of autonomy. See John
H. Mansfield, Constitutional Limits on the Liability of Churches for Negligent Supervision and
Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1167, 1177 (2003).
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nonreligious grounds for its decision. We know from the consistent
case law upholding the ministerial exception that this is not the case. 98
The recent decisions by the Florida Supreme Court in Doe v. Ev-
ans 99 and Malicki rl Doelo illustrate the difficulties in articulating such
a cause of action. The Florida Supreme Court, in Malicki, stated that:
(1) the employer was required to make an appropriate inves-
tigation of the employee and failed to do so; (2) an appro-
priate investigation would have revealed the unsuitability of
the employee for the particular duty to be performed or for
employment in general; and (3) it was unreasonable for the
employer to hire the employee in light of the information he
knew or should have known. 101
According to the court, these inquiries do not violate the U.S. Consti-
tution because a religious entity condemns sexual abuse and the
autonomy rules are limited to a specific subset. of disputes inapplica-
ble to tort cases.'" These limitations on the court's analysis miss the
point: the nature of the dispute is not determinative but, rather, one
must focus on how a court is to determine the meaning of key terms
in the legal standard—"appropriate investigation," "unsuitability,"
"particular duty," "employment," "employment in general," etc.—
without probing deeply into basic religious questions for a faith
community.
.	 The claim that negligent hiring requires no inquiry into religious
beliefs or practices seems questionable. Applied to churches, that
would seem to call for evidence of what various levels of authority
within a church actually do when the church selects someone for min-
istry, and why. The process a church actually undertook with respect
to determining fitness for ministry will then be measured by a jury or
other fact finder against a secular (i.e., court-imposed) standard. It
would seem difficult to complete such an evaluation without in some
sense trolling through religious beliefs and practices.
ga See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and Young People: Catholic and
Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44 li.C. L. REV. 1031, 1039 (2003) (discussing
the "judicially created 'ministerial exception' from civil rights laws" and citing cases).
" 814 So. 2c1 370 (Fla. 2002).
1 °° 814 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 2002).
1 ° 1 Id. at 361 (quoting Garcia v. Duffy, 992 So. 2d 435, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986))
(internal quotations omitted).
1 °2 See id. at 360-62.
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For example, negligent hiring means that the person placed in
ministry should not have been "hired." The "hiring decision" between
a religious body and those who minister for it are often themselves
religious acts, ordination or call, conducted according to the precepts
of religious law and practice. Moreover, the antecedent knowledge
supposedly available to religious leaders to prevent such a "hiring"
often would occur during the period of religious formation for ordi-
nation or call. In these circumstances, it would be profoundly difficult
for a court to be able to separate secular aspects of a so-called hiring
decision from religious actions undertaken exclusively under religious
law and practice. ] °s
Similarly, the question of retaining a person in ministry is often
bound up in questions of religious doctrine about reconciliation, res-
toration, and penance. Whether a minister is defrocked or otherwise
removed from the roster of clergy or reduced to the lay state is a ques-
tion of one's religious status as a "minister." Plainly such a decision
can have civil consequences, especially when one reflects on the issue
of exploitation. It seems to me, however, that to allow a cause of ac-
tion for negligent retention, as that term is commonly used by relig-
ious organizations, like the cause of action for negligent hiring of
ministers, is ultimately a challenge to religious doctrine and prac-
tice."
c. Negligent Supervision
A different question is presented under negligent supervision. In
those cases, the issue is not whether one should have been ordained
as a minister or whether the religious body is negligent in failing to
defrock a minister, but rather whether religious leaders were in pos-
session of information which, if acted upon, could have prevented the
harm upon which the lawsuit is based. The question is complex. To
recognize a claim of negligence in supervising a minister, on the one
hand, creates a risk of imposing upon the church, and upon the rela-
tionship between minister and church—what elsewhere has been
called the "lifeblood" of an organized church 105—a structure that may
be inimical to it. One court has observed that imposing secular ditties
and liabilities with respect to ministerial supervision would "infringe
upon [the church's] right to determine the standards governing the
See Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1150-51 (F.D. Mich. 1995).
1" See id.
190
 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
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relationship between the church, its bishop, and the parish priest." 106
On the other hand, when a minister has seriously harmed others, and
the church knows of a continued and substantial risk that he or she
will seriously harm others again, there are societal interests in allow-
ing recovery against the church whose failure to mitigate the known
risk may have created an opportunity for additional harm.
The Florida Supreme Court in Malicki, like other courts, found
no barrier to a negligent supervision claim.i 07 It found that the sub-
ject matter of the "dispute," sexual misconduct, did not create a
conflict between religious duties and the civil 1aw.'° 8 Because both
condemn abuse, there is no conflict and no constitutional problem.m
That simplistic approach does not deal with the issue, which does not
concern the dispute, but how the dispute must be resolved. The U.S.
Supreme Court has said not just the resolution of the dispute but "the
very process of inquiry" can create constitutional problems." 0 So too
here, if the plaintiff's claims depend on a court reviewing internal
policies and protocols, scrutinizing a religious chain of discipline, and
assessing culpability because the religious entity emphasized recon-
ciliation and not punishment, the "very process of inquiry" may lead
to an unconstitutional exercise.'"
Where such antecedent knowledge is both clear and in fact avail-
able to religious leaders, and directly relevant to the subject matter of
the underlying lawsuit, 10 a claim based on a failure of supervision
might constitutionally be stated.
tos Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 1997).
107 Sce 814 So. 2d at 360.
106 M. at 360-61.
i 09 See id.
ith NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979).
In Sec id.; see also Ayon v. Gourley; 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250 (D. Colo. 1998), aff'd on
other grounds, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999). Perhaps the issue is the way defenses are
framed. Most challenges to negligence claims assert a lack of subject matter jurisdiction as
opposed to a failure to state a claim. Where the objection goes to the evidenie and the
proofs, perhaps the latter is technically more correct, unless the complaint is a gross attack
on the religious supervision system. Compare Kelly v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 203 (1st
Cir. 1999) (affirming grant of sununary judgment for defendants), with Ayon, 47 F. Supp.
2d at 1248 (dismissing for failure to state a claim).
112 If the antecedent knowledge is related to some other form of questionable conduct
as opposed to the precise form of misconduct charged in the lawsuit, there would be no
basis for a negligent supervision claim. Sec Frith v. Fairview Baptist Church, No. 05-01-
01605CV, 2002 WL 1565664, at *3-4 (Tex. App. July 17, 2002) (affirming summary judg-
ment for defendant because, even though church breached duty to conduct background
check, doing so would not have made conduct foreseeable). In other words, the claimed
basis on which the religious leaders should act in cases of misconduct should be other
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In such cases, every possible defendant bearing the label Lu-
theran or Buddhist is not responsible for the negligent supervision. It
may be difficult to identify a "supervisor" in the strict sense. Some
churches are hierarchical in structure, others congregational. If there
is no mediating authority, is the congregation that calls a minister it-
self responsible for "supervising" him? If the congregation is unincor-
porated, do the pockets of each and every member of that congrega-
tion become subject to a lawsuit? In a hierarchical church, if respon-
sibility for the placement of a minister rests in the hands of a specific
religious superior, does that person then assume a secular duty for the
kind of oversight and day-to-day supervision that the law expects of
supervisors in a commercial setting? The imposition of such a secular
duty carries a risk of subtly altering the church's internal structure. A
number of courts have held that allowing such a deep probe into the
allocation of power within a church would violate the First Amend-
ment." 3
Applying the defendant-identifying principles set forth above,
one must identify which religious entity within the denominational
polity has the juridic authority and power to act in the particular area.
In a congregational polity, the defendant might be the local church
and its leaders who were given the power and ability to select and su-
pervise a minister. For hierarchical bodies, very often it is a regional
religious body that is in the sole position to have acted to prevent the
harm. In those polities, neither the local church nor the church-wide
bodies have the power and ability to prevent the harm from occur-
ring." 4
 Pressing more broadly framed assaults on religious entities
prior instances of misconduct of the minister—instances made known to religious leaders
in a position to act. Absent knowledge, there is no liability. Paul J.H. v. Lum, 736 N.Y.S.2d
561 (App. Div. 2002). Without any knowledge or an opportunity to supervise, there may be
no liability. Rivers v. Poisson, 761 A.2d 232, 235-36 (R.I. 2000) (finding no duty to super-
vise janitor in use of phone when no knowledge that janitor would use phone to harass
plaintiff); cf. Anonymous v. Dobbs Ferry Union Free Sch. Dist., 736 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118
(App. Div. 2002) (determining no liability in district because abuse occurred on social visit
away from school).
113 See, e.g., Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332
(S.D.NN. 2003); Swanson, 692 A.2d at 444 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the
United States & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09 (1976)); Gibson v. Brewer,
952 S.W.2d 239, 248 (Mo. 1997); Gray v. Ward, 950 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Mo. 1997); Pritzlaff v.
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995).
114 See Dewaard v. United Methodist Church, 793 So. 2d 1038, 1040-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (concluding local church was not supervising body over pastor and therefore
negligent supervision claim not possible against local church, but only against proper su•
pervising defendant, the regional conference and District Superintendent).
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that lack the ecclesial competence to have prevented the claimed
harm only invites more bad law and injustice to the common good.
Once the proper defendant is identified, the framing of the su-
pervision claim in the way least likely to engage a court in an uncon-
stitutional oversight of a religious entity is the "intentional failure to
supervise" cause recognized in the Missouri courts."' The basis on
which the religious entity failed to act would have to be clear and di-
rect, not based on supposition or inferred knowledge perhaps not
even technically available (such as through sacramental confession).
There the standard for inaction is clear, not negligence but a deliber-
ate inaction. And the focus is on some intent to allow a well-known
harm to occur.
d. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Fiduciary duty has been radically expanded in this area of the
law. Unmooring this cause from its traditional foundation in the law
of trusts, courts have entertained such claims with increasing fre-
quency in cases involving ministerial misconduct in the last ten years.
These claims present whether the minister, or more accurately those
who supervise the minister, have a relationship of trust and
confidence with the victim such that the religious entity responsible
for the minister must. take added care for the wellbeing of the victim.
Mere membership in the church body generally is not enough to cre-
ate a fiduciary relationship between the victim and the church
body."°
Of those courts that have reached the constitutional issue,'"
many have rejected fiduciary duty claims against churches on consti-
tutional grounds." 8 Courts commonly reason that such a claim would
us Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 248; Gray, 950 S.W.2d at 234.
118 See Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, No. 05-99-01774-CV, 2001 WL 856963, at *3
(Tex. App. July 31, 2001); Hawkins v. Trinity Baptist Church, 30 S.W.3d 446, 452-53 (Tex.
App. 2000). Similarly, even for a religious institution "'absent special relationships or cir-
cumstances, a person has no duty to protect another from criminal acts of a third person.'"
N.J. v. Greater Emanuel Temple Holiness Church, 611 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Ala. 1992)
(quoting Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Ala. 1992)).
117 Courts frequently reject fiduciary duty claims against churches for nonconstitu-
tional reasons. See Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 738 A.2d 839,
845-47 (Me. 1999) (rejecting claim of fiduciary duty because it was not fact-specific
enough and the church had no "generalized fiduciary duty ... to protect members of its
congregation front other members"); Gray, 950 S.W.2d at 234 (rejecting claim of fiduciary
duty as a recharacterization of other barred claims).
118 See Dausell, 52 F.3d at 1438-39 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Amato v. Greenquist, 679
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require them to define, and in turn measure a minister's conduct
against, a standard of care applicable to ministers as such. 119
 A breach
of fiduciary duty can "only be construed as clergy malpractice, since it
would clearly require a determination concerning [the minister's]
duties as a member of the clergy," thereby requiring the court. to
"'venture into forbidden ecclesiastical terrain." 20 In such cases relig-
ion is found to be the foundation for the relationship between the
plaintiff and the wrongdoer, not something "'merely incidental.'" 121
The minister-counselee or pastor-parishioner relationship is "ines-
capably premised upon the cleric's status as an expert in theological
and spiritual matters." 122
 The fact that the wrongful conduct is not
religiously motivated is therefore irrelevant 123 because pastoral and
spiritual responsibilities in such a case form the very basis for relief, a
fact that renders unconstitutional both the proceedings and the relief
sought.
In one case, a child molested by a peer claimed that his minister
and church owed the victim a fiduciary duty which the church defen-
dants breached by advising him to forgive and forget, and by referring
him for counseling to someone who claimed to be, but was not, a li-
censed mental health professional./ 24
 The Utah Supreme Court de-
termined that the fiduciary duty claim was "merely an elliptical way of
N.E.2d 446, 452-53 (III. App. Ct. 1997); Teadt v. Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, 603
N.W.2d 816, 822-23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Schieffer, 508 N.W.2d at 912; Langford v. Ro-
man Catholic Diocese, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (App. Div. 2000); Franco v. Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 208-09 (Utah 2001).
119 E.g., Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1929 (affirming dismissal of breach of fiduciary duty claim);
id. at 1438 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If the court were to
recognize such a breach of fiduciary duty, it would be required to define a reasonable duty
standard and to evaluate [the minister's] conduct against that standard, an inquiry identi-
cal to that which Illinois has declined to undertake in the context of a clergy malpractice
claim and one that is of doubtful validity under the Free Exercise Clause."); id. at 1429
(Coffey, J., concurring) (agreeing with Judge Ripple's analysis of the fiduciary duty claim);
Schieffer, 508 N.W.2d at 912 r[A]nalyzing and defining the scope of a fiduciary duty owed
persons by their clergy, the [clown would be confronted by the same constitutional
difficulties encountered in articulating the generalized standard of care for a clergyman
required by the law of negligence.'") (quoting Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 326).
126
 Langford, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 662; see Teadt, 603 N.W.2d at 823.
121
 Amato, 679 N.E.2d at 454 (quoting H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 99 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995)).
122 Id.
123 See id. ("[Wie would consider unlikely the Pastor's ability to establish that his behav-
ior in this case was religiously motivated," but the fiduciary duty claim was barred nonethe-
less.). The case involved a claim that defendant began an affair with counselee's spouse,
also a counselee of defendant. Id. at 448.
124 Franco, 21 P.3d at 200-01.
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alleging clergy malpractice." 125 "Mad advice" from a minister is not
actionable. 126 The courts could not decide such claims "without first
ascertaining whether the [church defendants] performed within the
level of expertise expected of a similar professional, i.e., a reasonably
prudent bishop, priest, rabbi, minister, or other cleric in this state."'"
Courts that have allowed fiduciary duty claims against ministers
and churches usually do so because the wrongful conduct was not
part of the defendants' religious beliefs or practices or does not re-
quire interpretation of religious doctrine. 128 When fiduciary duty
claims arise out of sexual or other misconduct between minister and
counselee or parishioner, the conduct complained of is rarely, if ever,
religiously motivated. If the absence of grounding in specific religious
beliefs or practices were sufficient to permit a claim of fiduciary duty,
those claims (and, indeed, many others) would not be barred. Claims
for racial discrimination under Title VII or clergy malpractice would
be similarly permissible, at least when no defense was predicated on
religious belief or church doctrine. 129
Courts have generally suggested only one other reason for allow-
ing fiduciary duty claims—namely, that the plaintiff in fact reposed
trust in the minister and church.'" Is this reason sufficient to permit a
fiduciary duty claim and to overcome the constitutional objection?
Examination of two cases may help answer the question.
In Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, a female counselee had a sexual re-
lationship with her Episcopal minister. 151 The counselee's husband,
and later the counselee herself, disclosed the affair to the bishop and
sought his intervention. 132 The bishop, who the counselee and her
husband thought would resolve the problem, told the woman she
should keep the matter in confidence.'" The woman later sued the
12s Sec id. at 205.
126 Sec id.
127 Id. In addition, claimants cannot sue to enforce religious duties or seek damages
for their breach. See Roman Catholic Bishop v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399,406
(Ct. App. 1996) (denying claim that church has civil duty to enforce celibacy).
128 See Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409,431 (2d
Cir. 1999); Moses, 863 P.2d at 321; Evans, 814 So. 2d at 376.
129 Government action need not burden a specific religious belief or practice, or re-
quire interpretation of church doctrine, to violate a church's claim of autonomy. Other-
wise, claims by ministry personnel would and could be adjudicated. See supr4 notes 97-98
and accompanying text.
m See Martinelli, 196 F.3d at 430-31; Moses 863 P.2d at 322-23.
131 Moses, 863 P.2d at 322-23.
132 Id. at 317-18.
153 Id.
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minister and the bishop, the latter for breach of fiduciary duty. 184
Among other things, the jury was instructed, without objection, to
consider whether the plaintiffs "repose of trust was justified; whether
the Diocese or [the bishop] knew, or should have known, that [plain-
tiff] was relying on Ethel [b] ishop ... to look out for her interests,"
and whether the bishop "invited" her trust.'" The jury returned a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the bishop.'" An ap-
peals court affirmed, holding that the bishop "held a position of
authority in the church and had the power to resolve conflicts in the
church."'" The bishop's role in meeting with the plaintiff, the appeals
court concluded, was "as a counselor" to her."8 The plaintiff believed
that the bishop "had the power to decide if she would lose her salva-
tion," and therefore felt constrained to follow his advice.i"g There was
evidence, the court wrote, that the bishop undertook "to resolve the
problems" the plaintiff presented to him. 14° "Once a member of the
clergy accepts the parishioner's trust and accepts the role of coun-
selor," the court concluded, "a duty exists to act with the utmost good
faith for the benefit of the parishioner.""' Under the general princi-
ples of the law, a direct undertaking by a person with authority to act
for the benefit of the other would be enough to sustain a conclusion
that there exists a fiduciary duty. 142
t 34 See id. at 314.
133 /d. at 32211.14.
136 Moses, 863 P.2d at 313-14.
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1 * Id. at 322-23.
" I Moses, 863 P.2d at 323.
H2
 Mary Moses's claim that the bishop owed her a fiduciary duty seemed to arise
wholly from his status as bishop and his representation to her that he would resolve the
problem. If episcopal status and representations of this type were sufficient to create a
fiduciary duty on the part of a bishop, however, it would seem that any bishop or religious
superior would be a fiduciary simply by virtue of pastoral acts directed toward those within
his episcopal jurisdiction, a conclusion that cannot be reconciled with the U.S. Constitu-
tion because it turns episcopal offices and standards into civil ones, and general policies
into specifically enforceable fiduciary duties. Brown u Pearson and other cases reject that
point. See 483 S.E.2d 477,484-85 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997). The least constitutionally offensive
way to interpret Moses consistent with the constitutional principles is to construe the case
as turning on the specific undertaking by the bishop made personally to plaintiff. Ayon v.
Gourley expressly rejects Moses on this point. 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1248-49 (referring to the
view taken in Moses as "extremely expansive"). Finally, allowing a jury the authority to
evaluate evidence about the scope of a bishop's duties and render a verdict based on what
it thinks a bishop should do is precisely the abuse condemned in United States v. Ballard. See
322 U.S. 78,86-88 (1944).
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In Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Coati., the plain-
tiff claimed that the diocese owed him a fiduciary duty to investigate
reports of sexual abuse of other persons by a priest who had allegedly
sexually abused the plaintiff, and also to inform the plaintiff of his
possible injuries, the memories of which he was said to have re-
pressed.'" The evidence that plaintiff presented indicated no special
undertaking by the diocese as to him."4 His experience as a member
of the local church, except for the fact that he was abused, was no dif-
ferent than that of his peers: he attended youth activities, camps, field
trips, and was confirmed.'" This was enough; the appeals court con-
cluded, to support the jury's finding of a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and diocese. 148 The court rejected the diocese's
First Amendment objection because the jury had not been asked to
consider the validity of any religious teaching or to enforce church
law. 147 The jury had been asked, in the court's view, only to decide
whether a relationship of trust and confidence existed between the
plaintiff and the diocese."8
Ministerial status is generally not a defense against fiduciary duty
claims arising from factors separate from one's ecclesiastical or relig-
ious duties. The minister who holds himself or herself out as a
financial advisor owes the same duty of care with respect to his or her
client's investments as any other financial advisor. The minister who
practices psychiatry owes his or her patients a fiduciary duty not to
engage in sexual relationships with them in the same manner as any
other psychiatrist. 149 But the minister who holds himself out as a min-
143 196 F.3d at 415,426.
144 Sec id. at 429.
145 See id. at 413-14.
146 See id. at 429-30.
147 See id. at 430-31.
14° See Martinelli, 196 F.3d at 430-31.
149 Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426,441,443
(Minn. 2002) (distinguishing between the acts of the minister as minister and counselor,
and remanding for a determination of the jurisdiction to hear claims against the supervis-
ing religious body); see also Sanders v. Cam View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331,335-36 (5th
Cir. 1998) (allowing jury to determine if marriage counseling was "essentially secular"
provided defendant with more than enough constitutional protection). On remand from
the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota determined that the
religious entity could be held liable in a tort case on a theory of negligent employment
(supervision, training and retention) without violating the constitutional rights of the faith
community. Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 657 N.W.2d 569,
575-77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). The court's determination in this regard turns on the
artificial distinction between the pastor's duties as pastor (and the church's actions towards
or concerning him in that regard) and the entity's failure to act on information indicating
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ister, the bishop who holds himself out as a bishop, and the rabbi Who
holds himself out as a rabbi, does not assume civil duties by virtue of
having assumed religious ones.' 5°
In considering what it determined to be evidence of a fiduciary
relationship, the court in Martinelli seemed remarkably unperturbed
by reliance upon such religious teachings as that which holds a bishop
to be a "shepherd" of his flock.'" The court likened its consideration
of such teachings to rules of hearsay, in which a statement is admitted
into evidence not for the truth of the assertion, but to prove some
other fact. 152
 What the analogy overlooks is that when the character of
a religious leader's office is admitted into evidence, the applicability
of a secular standard is made to depend upon an ecclesial one. In this
case, evidence was admitted on whether the defendant invited, and
the plaintiff reposed, trust in the bishop as shepherd of his flock) 53 The
bishop, after all, had not held himself out as an investment counselor
or psychiatrist. He had held himself out as a bishop. Hence the rea-
sonableness of his actions, the scope of his pastoral obligations, the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's expectations—all of these were
defined by the bishop and plaintiff's shared religion, and, of course,
other religions may define these obligations and expectations differ-
ently as to their own religious leaders. To hear evidence about the
character of a religious office, and then, based on those characteris-
tics, to impose and enforce civil duties upon religious leaders by virtue
of their position and role as religious leaders, clearly seems to be an
unconstitutional exercise of government power.
sexual improprieties. In fact there is no way to read the decision except to conclude that
the court believes the better policy is to hold the religious body in the case liable and allow
the possible unconstitutional evidence or proofs to be excluded at trial. See id. at 574, 576;
see also id. at 577 (allowing a vicarious liability claim to go forward).
150 In Evans, the Florida Supreme Court noted there were two fiduciary duty claims,
one against the minister and the other against the church. 814 So. 2d at 374. Remarkably,
after reviewing cases about duties of ministers, the court conflated the two and made the
church liable as if its acts were the intentional misconduct of the ministers. See id. at 375.
This is strict liability, not negligence. The better view of the law is that a breach of fiduciary
duty must be based on some actual undertaking directed at the plaintiff (not some undif-
ferentiated group) by the religious entity and those authorized to act for it. Doe v. Hartz,
52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1062-64 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
151 See 196 F.3d at 431.
152 See id.
155 Id.
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CONCLUSION
This brief Article cannot evaluate all the various claims that could
be presented against religious bodies, The task confronting courts is
to identify the proper defendant against which constitutionally stated
claims could lie. The identification of the defendant is an exercise in
reviewing the corporate and ecciesial documents of the religious or-
ganization to decide which entity in the polity has the precise author-
ity to act on the complaint underlying the lawsuit. In addition, courts
do not limit their inquiries to these documents but may place respon-
sibility on a part of the polity that, notwithstanding its civil or ecclesial
authority to act, has insinuated itself into the dispute. Courts looking
for a reliable way to apportion responsibility in complex tort cases
against religious organizations would avoid unconstitutional action if
they more routinely followed these principles.
In addition, application of these principles in particular (and
popular) areas of tort law shows how courts should and should not
act. In those cases, especially courts looking for ways to punish relig-
ions bodies for their failure to prevent abuse by individual ministers,
often there is a willingness to lower standards of knowledge and ac-
countability, even importing secular standards. Religious entities are
responsible for the mistakes they make, and recovery in tort is one
way to assess that responsibility. But wholesale disregard of constitu-
tional principle also sacrifices well-established liability principle for
short-term punishment.
